We have studied the effect of memory on evolution of the prisoner's dilemma game using square lattice networks. Based on extensive simulations, we found that the density of cooperators was enhanced by an increasing memory effect for most parameters. However, we also observed that the density of cooperators decreased with an increased memory effect in the case of a large memory and moderate temptation. It is interesting to note that memory makes cooperators immune from temptation. The strength of protection reaches its maximal value only for the moderate memory effect.
I. INTRODUCTION
The evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) has attracted substantial attention over the past few decades [1] . In this game, two agents must simultaneously select one of two strategies: cooperation or defection. The prisoners receive payoffs that are dependent on their choices. A selfish agent will adapt their strategy to maximize their payoff. Game theory involves the construction of many types of models and analysis of these models using varied parameters. Therefore, game theory serves as a powerful metaphore for simulation of the interactions between individuals in many domains, including biology, economy, and ecology.
In the PDG, mutual cooperation generates the highest return for the community. However, the Nash equilibrium state is mutual defection because defection is a better choice for the prisoner, regardless of the strategy of the other prisoner. Importantly, in the real world, mutual cooperation is the most commonly utilized strategy. Systems such as the PDG are considered to be an important tool for study the emergence of cooperative behavior between selfish individuals [2, 3, 4] . Nowak and May [5] introduced a spatial prisoner's dilemma game (SPDG) consisting of a two-state cellular automaton. In the general SPDG, the agents in the game play the PDG with their network neighbors and get payoffs according to a payoff matrix. The total payoff of each agent is the sum of all payoffs in this step. An agent may then mimic his neighbor's strategy by comparing his payoffs in this step with his neighbor's payoffs. An important conclusion is that spatial structure can promote the persistence of cooperation. Because the interactions of an agent are limited to his local neighbors, PDG models have been extensively explored in the past few years [1, 6, 7, 8] . In addition to spatial structure, there are several mechanisms that may facilitate the emergence and persistence of cooperation * Corresponding author. Email: ychen@lzu.edu.cn among populations. Hamilton found that kin selection can favor cooperation [9] . Axelrod's model demonstrated that the tit for tat strategy could sustain cooperation in systems of all players playing the game together. The simulation performed by Szabó, Vukov, and Szolnoki provided evidence that noise and irrational choices affect the maintenance of cooperative behavior [10] .
In the traditional SPDG model, the changing probability of strategy is determined by the agents' performance on one step. In other words, people assume that the agents are shortsighted and forgetful. In fact, when people make an important decision, they generally consider the current situation and their experiences. Therefore, the effect of memory should be taken into account. Historical memory plays a key role in the evolutionary game [11] . The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether memory enhances the density of cooperators and detracts the cooperators from the temptation. We observed the maximum value of critical points from a homogeneous cooperator to a mixed state of cooperator and defector.
In this paper, we consider an evolutionary SPDG with the memory effect in a square lattice, in which players update their strategy by considering previous payoffs. The rules of the game are explained in section II. The simulations, which are detailed in section III, show that the evolution of SPDG depends on the magnitude of the memory effect and payoff-matrix elements. Conclusions are drawn in the last section.
II. MODEL
In the traditional PDG, there are two players. Each player choses one of two strategies: cooperator (C) or defector (D). There are four combinations for the two players: (C, C), (C, D), (D, C), and (D, D), which corresponded to payoffs (R, R), (S, T ), (T , S), and (P , P ). The rewards or punishments for each player can be tabulated as 2 × 2 payoff matrices (see Table I ).
Four elements in the payoff matrix satisfy the order 
ranking T > R > P > S and the additional constraint T + S < 2R for repeated interactions. As suggested by Nowak and May [5] , the parameters in this paper are R = 1, T = b, S = 0, and P = 0. Our model preserve the essentials of PDG and b is the only tunable parameter. Our study is based on systematic Monte Carlo (MC) simulations on a square lattice network with periodic boundary conditions. When we applied the PDG on the network, the players were located on the nodes. In every MC step, the players simultaneously play the PDG with their network neighbors (only the first neighborhoods) and themselves. The sum payoff of each player is the sum over all games. The evolutionary process is governed by strategy imitation. In every MC step, all agents may mimic their neighbors strategy. Player i adopts a (randomly chosen) neighbor's strategy (at site j) with a probability that depends upon the payoff difference:
where κ indicates the noise generated by the players allowing irrational choices [12, 13] . In this work, we use κ = 0.1 for all simulations. E m (i) and E m (j) are the total payoffs which contain the sum payoffs at this MC step U and the cumulative historical payoff. For each node i, there are two memories M c (i, t) and M d (i, t) at step t. When node i is associated with the strategy C and the sum payoff at this MC step is U ,
for this time step. When the node i is associated with strategy D
Here, τ is the memory factor and 0 ≤ τ < 1. M c (i, t) and M d (i, t) represent the historical payoffs of C and D, respectively. The memory effect for each MC step declines with time. In other words, memories of the payoffs, M c (i, t) and M d (i, t), will be forgotten as time passes. τ = 0 indicates that there is no memory effect. As τ nears to 1, there exists an almost perfect memory effect in the model. Starting from a random initial state with an equal fraction of C and D and M c (i, 0) = M d (i, 0) = 0, we iterate the model with a synchronized update. 
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
Our simulations are carried out by varying b and τ . The results described in this paper are obtained from MC simulations with a system size of 200 × 200, with the exception of the results shown in Fig. 4 . It is true that a network with larger size will decrease the ensemble error, which is caused by the finite scale of networks. We have simulated our model with 100×100 and 400×400. There is not conspicuous difference among these networks. The results in this manuscript are the average of 20 trials with various random seeds. Repeating simulations with different random seeds can also reduce the error. Therefore, the 200 × 200 is large enough. The transient time is varied from 20, 000 to 80, 000 MC steps. After the transient state, the system reached the stable state, and the amplitudes of population fluctuations were considerably smaller than the corresponding average value.
To characterize the macroscopic behavior of the system, we measure the density of C f c first. Fig. 1 shows the f c on the square lattice as a function of b for several values of τ . We find that there are two thresholds of temptation b. When b < b c1 , the networks in which only C can survive are in the stable state. The density of C decreases monotonously with increasing values of b for b > b c1 . We upload the movies which presents how the systems with network size of 240 × 240 evolve in 300 MC steps after transient time on different b and τ [14] . In these movies Cs are presented by black boxes and Ds are presented by red boxes. It is observed that the agents who utilize the same strategies join together to form complex patterns that continuously move and change shape. These patterns develop because agents change their strategies by learning from their neighbors. Furthermore, the Cs who join together are more stable Fig. 2) . Fig. 1 , we find the memory effect enhances the density of C in most cases; however, the density of C decreases with increasing of τ only for τ > 0.72 and 1.75 < b < 1.8. It should be noted that our simulations are consistent with those presented in Fig. 1 of Ref. [12] for τ = 0 despite the fact that Szabó and Töke used the asynchronized update law in their model. The mean-field results for six-point approximations [16] agree with the simulation in [12] and our model in the case of τ = 0. We assume that the six-point approximation includes the main features of the two models. Importantly, the six-point approximation does not contain a restriction of the update law. Therefore, it is conjectured that the synchronized update does not play an important role in the two models.
In comparision to the case of τ = 0, we know that enhancement of the density of C is caused by M c and M d . From the above-mentioned definitions, the M c and M d of one node are determined by two factors: (1) the payoff income U of every MC step and (2) whether the node maintains one strategy. M c or M d is aggravated In [12, 15] , the authors discussed the critical exponent of b c1 and b c2 . Their MC simulations indicated a power-law behavior, namely
β , and the values of β agreed with the directed percolation (DP) exponent. Grassberger and Janssen conjectured that all one-component models with a single absorbing state belong to the universality class of (DP) [19] . The value of critical exponents should be independent of the details of dynamical rules and dependent on the spatial dimension. In this paper, we investigated these exponents in the context of different values of τ . Fig. 4 shows that β, which ranged from 0.47 (τ = 0) to 1.10825 (τ = 0.9) is monotonously increase with τ . Therefore, the value of the critical exponent is not universal but depends on the memory factor τ in this model.
Considering that a persistent unchanged strategy at one site leads to the accumulation history payoff, we investigated the mobility of spatial patterns of τ . Population mobility is a central feature of real ecosystems: animals migrate, bacteria run and tumble. Similar phenomena can be observed in a rock-paper-scissors game [20] . Reichenbach, Mobilia, and Frey, observed that mo- bility critical influence on species diversity. In this model, we find that the behavior of b c1 is caused by the decrease in strategy mobility. This means that C resists temptation b by decreasing mobility. Therefore, we introduce the time autocorrelation function of strategy:
where s i (t) is the strategy of player i at MC step t. When player i chose C, s i (t) = 1. In contrast, s i (t) = −1 for D.
denotes an average over all nodes in the networks. Considering that g(τ, b, t) can be affected by density of C and in order to ensure that g(τ, b, t) ranges from 0 to 1, we chose b such that f c = 0.5. This definition describes whether the node's recent strategy correlates with its strategy at later t MC steps. Fig. 5(a) displays the attenuation of g(τ, t) fc=0.5 with time. It was found that g(τ, t) fc=0.5 fits with the form g(τ, t) fc=0.5 = exp(−t/ρ(τ )). One can regard ρ as the characteristic residence time of the unaltered strategy. We define t h as the number of MC steps for which one strategy was maintained and assume that the characteristic residence time ρ and t h have a similar ratio: −z , where the exponent is z = 2.22 with standard deviation 0.043. Now we focus our attention on the behavior of b c1 . When b > b c1 , C cannot resist temptation b and D appears. Therefore, b c1 can be regarded as the ability of the model to protect C. As described in the discussion above, the D gangs undergo four basic processes. When b = b c1 and 1 − f c ≪ 1, the annihilation process is rare, while the death and branching processes are major activities. Therefore, D gangs become stable if the branching rate is greater than the death rate. We found that the single D in the branching process will have an offspring and form D-D pairs (as shown in Fig. 6 ). The D-D pair plays an important role in the branching process of D gangs. When we discard the effect of noise, the total payoff E m of each player in D-D pairs (nodes A and B in Fig. 6 ) must be larger than the payoff of his neighbor C (node C in Fig. 6) . Otherwise, the D gangs will eventually die. For example, in the case of τ = 0, the total payoff of each player in D-D pairs is 3b, and the total payoff of his neighbor C is 4. Therefore, the threshold for a stable D is b c1 = 4/(3b) = 4/3. We suggest that the deviation of 4/3 , which was obtained our simulations was caused by noise.
The behavior of a stable D is subtle for τ > 0. Based on the discussion above, the increase of t h with τ and t h determines the player's memory and total payoffs. Therefore, we can use t h to approximate b c1 . When the t h of the D-D pair is N and we neglect the remnants M d , which accumulated many MC steps ago and assume that neighbor C can remain as C indefinitely because of the dominance of C at b = b c1 , we find that
In Fig. 2 , we plot the results from Eq. (6) which are similar to the simulation results. We use A = 27 and B = 0.63 in Eq. (5).
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the ability of memory to protect C from D in an evolutionary PDG in a square lattice networks. With an increase in the effect of memory, there is an increase in the density of C in most cases. In compution of the autocorrelation function, we used the characteristic residence time to measure the mobility of a spatial pattern. We also found that the mobility of a spacial pattern decreases with the memory effect. Decreasing mobility induces a maximum value of critical coexistence point b c1 at τ = 0.72. It is obvious that mobility plays an important role in this model. The effect of memory on cooperative behaviors may draw some attention in evolutionary games.
We have also applied this model to the Newman-Watts small-world (NWSW) networks [21] . The NWSW network is a two dimension small-world network. We found that moderate long range links did not have an obvious qualitative influence on our model.
